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Covert Commerce During the Civil War
Although it breaks no new ground and is based primarily on previously
published works, Trading with the Enemy is a welcome addition to the literature
on the Civil War for providing a concise and readable account of the illicit trade
between the lines, one of the most neglected features of the war. Long buried in
the testimony of congressional committee hearings and the convoluted records of
the U.S. Treasury Department, the story of how cotton was the basis of a
flourishing trade across the lines has received scant attention, save for
specialized journal articles.
As Leigh stresses in his opening chapter, cotton accounted for two-thirds of
American exports and had become the linchpin of the global economy by the
mid-nineteenth century, and neither England nor the Union North could long
afford to be without it. Responding to pressures from New England textile
manufacturers to bring out cotton and anxious to stave off a cotton famine in
Europe, Lincoln issued executive permits through the Treasury Department for
private individuals of reputedly solid Unionist credentials to trade in cotton
behind Union lines. By an executive order in September, 1864, he even allowed
cotton sellers to import back through Confederate lines non-contraband
merchandise equal in value to one-third the sale price of the cotton.
Despite a host of federal regulations and legal restraints, the cotton trade
became a speculative bonanza and a breeding ground of endless corruption that
demoralized Union soldiers and funneled vitally needed supplies into the
Confederacy. The trade centered in the lower Mississippi Valley and a good
argument can be made that the supplies smuggled into the Confederacy from
Memphis and New Orleans, two cities occupied by the Union for most of the
war, made these cities economically more valuable to the Confederate war effort
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outside rather than inside the Confederacy. In a report to Lincoln in May, 1864,
from Memphis, General Daniel Sickles estimated the value of the supplies
moving southward at $500,000 a week. Through a government Cotton Bureau
set up by General Kirby Smith, the largely autonomous Trans-Mississippi
Department of the Confederacy by the summer of 1864 had earned $30 million
in specie by trading in cotton. Although Confederate authorities led by President
Davis denounced trading with the Yankee enemy as inherently corrupting and
demoralizing, in practice they looked the other way.
Without a doubt the exchange of cotton for Union goods was a major prop
to the war-making capacity of the Confederacy. Why then did Lincoln permit,
even encourage, trading across the lines? Ever the pragmatist, Lincoln was well
aware there was no substitute for cotton for the textile industries of the North or
as means of earning foreign exchange in the export trade. Moreover, once the
Confederacy realized in 1863 that it had badly miscalculated with its
ill-conceived cotton embargo and shifted to an aggressive policy of seizing as
much cotton as it could and exporting it through the Union blockade in return for
goods and specie from Europe, the price of cotton had skyrocketed to the point
where the Confederate government was receiving in return six times or more
what a given bale of cotton would have earned early in the war. As Lincoln
explained to more than one angry Union general, every bale that went to the
North, regardless of the corruption and shady private gain involved, was one less
bale that could be converted by the Confederacy into financial and possible
diplomatic support from Europe. That same bale was one more that would
strengthen the Union economy and thereby political backing for the war. Lincoln
also understood that the demoralization that was inseparable from the trade cut
both ways. Confederate, as well as Union, officers were bribed to look the other
way. The cotton and sugar planters eager to make money again, to say nothing of
the countless small farmers in the South desperate to fend off impoverishment,
who abandoned the Confederacy by trading with the enemy of the Confederate
state, progressively sapped the will of Southern civilians to continue the war.
As the author contends, any examination of the trading across the lines strips
away much of the romanticized haze which still informs our impressions of the
war. Still, I find his conclusion that this trading disproportionately was to the
advantage of the Confederacy and “unnecessarily protracted the war and
lengthened the casualty lists" (p. 147) to be problematic. Lincoln had to take into
account the economic and political, as well as purely military, dimensions of the
war. He had limited power to control an illegal trade that was going to occur
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regardless of what he did and he simply could not ignore powerful constituencies
on the home front who demanded access to cotton. By the author’s estimation,
more than two-thirds of the some 1.5 million bales of cotton shipped out of the
Confederacy went to the North and not Europe. Lincoln, had he been aware of
these figures, would have been pleased with the result.
William L. Barney teaches U.S. history at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill. He is currently working on a study of Southern secession.
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